<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">445829788</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20180317145310.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">170323e20110201xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s10657-010-9195-6</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10657-010-9195-6</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Bertrand</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Elodie</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Univ Lille Nord de France (ULCO, EQUIPPE), Lille, France</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">What do cattle and bees tell us about the Coase theorem?</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Elodie Bertrand]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Two empirical studies on well-known externalities seem to confirm Coase's (J Law Econ 17(2):357-376, 1960) insight, according to which transactions on property rights will occur if their gains are greater than their costs. However, the trespassing cattle case (Ellickson in, Stanford Law Rev 38(3): 623-687, 1986) shows that neighbours do not refer to legal entitlements and settle their disputes without monetary transaction, which may be due, according to us, to other impediments to bargaining than transaction costs: some social norms prevent the market from developing. Such a market exists in the pollinating bees case (Cheung in, J Law Econ 16(1): 11-33, 1973), but we show that, if transactions over ‘externalities' are facilitated, other externalities, which remain at its borders, are also handled with social norms. Both studies contribute to an institutional description of the functioning of a market over rights or of its impediments.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2010</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Coase theorem</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Externalities</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Social norms</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Nuisance</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Market</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">European Journal of Law and Economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">31/1(2011-02-01), 39-62</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0929-1261</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">31:1&lt;39</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2011</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">31</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">10657</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9195-6</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9195-6</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">100</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Bertrand</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Elodie</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Univ Lille Nord de France (ULCO, EQUIPPE), Lille, France</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">European Journal of Law and Economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">31/1(2011-02-01), 39-62</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0929-1261</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">31:1&lt;39</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2011</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">31</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">10657</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
