caa a22 4500 445829818 CHVBK 20180317145310.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20110601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5 Guha Brishti School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, 178903, Singapore, Singapore aut Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial? [Elektronische Daten] [Brishti Guha] Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates' actions during his trial were rational, using two different models. Our analysis sheds some light on institutional efficiency in trials that followed the classical Athenian pattern. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2010 Trial nationallicence Jury preferences nationallicence Private information nationallicence Ancient athens nationallicence Socrates nationallicence Rationality nationallicence Common nationallicence Knowledge nationallicence European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 31/3(2011-06-01), 249-264 0929-1261 31:3<249 2011 31 10657 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Guha Brishti School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, 178903, Singapore, Singapore aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 31/3(2011-06-01), 249-264 0929-1261 31:3<249 2011 31 10657 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer