caa a22 4500 445829842 CHVBK 20180317145310.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20110601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10657-011-9228-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10657-011-9228-9 Race, politics, and punishment [Elektronische Daten] [Peter Leeson, Russell Sobel] This paper empirically evaluates two competing theories of electoral accountability in the context of New Orleans' 2006 mayoral election. According to the democratic efficiency theory, voters can successfully punish ineffective political agents by removing them from office. In contrast, the public choice theory argues that the bundled nature of political goods prevents voters from successfully holding ineffective politicians accountable. We find that although there is limited support for the punishment effect predicted by the democratic efficiency theory, this effect is overwhelmed by the fact that the bundle of goods politicians offer contains elements that pull in opposing directions. This prevents the punishment effect from having any real impact, leading to democratic failure. Our results support the public choice theory of electoral (un)accountability. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2011 Democratic failure nationallicence Hurricane Katrina nationallicence New Orleans nationallicence Leeson Peter Department of Economics, George Mason University, MSN 3G4, 22030, Fairfax, VA, USA aut Sobel Russell Department of Economics, West Virginia University, 26506-6025, Morgantown, WV, USA aut European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 31/3(2011-06-01), 265-285 0929-1261 31:3<265 2011 31 10657 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9228-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9228-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Leeson Peter Department of Economics, George Mason University, MSN 3G4, 22030, Fairfax, VA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sobel Russell Department of Economics, West Virginia University, 26506-6025, Morgantown, WV, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- European Journal of Law and Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 31/3(2011-06-01), 265-285 0929-1261 31:3<265 2011 31 10657 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer