<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">445852186</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20180317145416.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">170323e20110201xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s11227-010-0427-x</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11227-010-0427-x</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Efficient and short certificateless signatures secure against realistic adversaries</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Raylin Tso, Xun Yi, Xinyi Huang]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">The notion of certificateless cryptography is aimed to eliminate the use of certificates in traditional public key cryptography and also to solve the key-escrow problem in identity-based cryptography. Many kinds of security models have been designed for certificateless cryptography and many new schemes have been introduced based on the correspondence of the security models. In generally speaking, a stronger security model can ensure a certificateless cryptosystem with a higher security level, but a realistic model can lead to a more efficient scheme. In this paper, we focus on the efficiency of a certificateless signature (CLS) scheme and introduce an efficient CLS scheme with short signature size. On one hand, the security of the scheme is based on a realistic model. In this model, an adversary is not allowed to get any valid signature under false public keys. On the other hand, our scheme is as efficient as BLS short signature scheme in both communication and computation and, therefore, turns out to be more efficient than other CLS schemes proposed so far. We provide a rigorous security proof of our scheme in the random oracle model. The security of our scheme is based on the k-CAA hard problem and a new discovered hard problem, namely the modified k-CAA problem. Our scheme can be applied to systems where signatures are typed in by human or systems with low-bandwidth channels and/or low-computation power.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2010</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Bilinear pairing</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Certificateless signature</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Cryptographic protocol</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Digital signature</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Random oracle model</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Short signature</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Tso</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Raylin</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Computer Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Yi</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Xun</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Computer Science and Mathematics, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Huang</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Xinyi</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore, Republic of Singapore</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">The Journal of Supercomputing</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">55/2(2011-02-01), 173-191</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0920-8542</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">55:2&lt;173</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2011</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">55</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11227</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-010-0427-x</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-010-0427-x</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Tso</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Raylin</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Computer Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Yi</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Xun</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Computer Science and Mathematics, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Huang</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Xinyi</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore, Republic of Singapore</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">The Journal of Supercomputing</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">55/2(2011-02-01), 173-191</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0920-8542</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">55:2&lt;173</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2011</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">55</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11227</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
