caa a22 4500 445854391 CHVBK 20180317145423.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00191-010-0204-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00191-010-0204-2 Stahl Dale Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA aut Cooperation in the sporadically repeated prisoners' dilemma via reputation mechanisms [Elektronische Daten] [Dale Stahl] We consider the sporadically repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, examine a class of two-state reputation mechanisms and find that only three have efficient robust perfect Nash equilibria in Markov strategies. Since the asymptotic stability properties are crucial to their plausibility as realistic solutions, we examine replicator dynamics for the simplest reputation mechanism that entails both punishment and penitence. The strategy to cooperate with Good opponents and defect against Bad opponents is a global attractor of replicator dynamics, and hence cooperation is successfully sustained in the long run. Springer-Verlag, 2010 Reputation mechanisms nationallicence Prisoners' dilemma nationallicence Replicator dynamics nationallicence Journal of Evolutionary Economics Springer-Verlag 21/4(2011-10-01), 687-702 0936-9937 21:4<687 2011 21 191 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-010-0204-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-010-0204-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Stahl Dale Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Evolutionary Economics Springer-Verlag 21/4(2011-10-01), 687-702 0936-9937 21:4<687 2011 21 191 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer