caa a22 4500 445854413 CHVBK 20180317145423.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00191-010-0179-z doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00191-010-0179-z Rtischev Dimitry Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin University, 1-5-1 Mejiro, 171-8588, Toshima-ku, Tokyo, Japan aut Evolution of vulnerability to pain in interpersonal relations as a strategic trait aiding cooperation [Elektronische Daten] [Dimitry Rtischev] Why are humans so vulnerable to pain in interpersonal relations and can so easily hurt others physically and emotionally? We theoretically examine whether being offensively strong but defensively weak can evolve as a strategic trait that fosters cooperation. We study a population comprised of "thick-skinned” and "thin-skinned” agents by using an indirect evolution model that combines rational choice in strategic interactions with evolutionary selection across generations. We find that (a) the relatively vulnerable and cooperative thin-skins cannot evolve under purely random matching, (b) with some assortment thin-skins evolve and can take over the entire population, (c) vulnerability to greater pain makes it easier for thin-skins to evolve, and (d) proximate pain which merely feels bad but does not lower fitness helps thin-skins evolve even more than pain which accurately reflects fitness consequences. We draw contrast with the Hawk-Dove model and identify several ways in which rationality hinders the evolution of the relatively vulnerable and peaceful type of agent. Springer-Verlag, 2010 Cooperation nationallicence Conflict avoidance nationallicence Hawk-Dove nationallicence Pain nationallicence Emotions nationallicence Vulnerability nationallicence Indirect evolution nationallicence Assortative matching nationallicence Journal of Evolutionary Economics Springer-Verlag 21/5(2011-12-01), 757-782 0936-9937 21:5<757 2011 21 191 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-010-0179-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-010-0179-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Rtischev Dimitry Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin University, 1-5-1 Mejiro, 171-8588, Toshima-ku, Tokyo, Japan aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Evolutionary Economics Springer-Verlag 21/5(2011-12-01), 757-782 0936-9937 21:5<757 2011 21 191 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer