caa a22 4500 44585443X CHVBK 20180317145424.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00191-010-0182-4 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00191-010-0182-4 In search of an evolutionary edge: trading with a few, more, or many [Elektronische Daten] [Oded Stark, Doris Behrens] Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the "span of interaction.” Trade is governed by a prisoner's dilemma "rule of engagement.” A farmer's payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner's dilemma games played with his $^m/_2$ neighbors to the left, and with his $^m/_2$ neighbors to the right. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son who adheres to his father's span of interaction decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous member of the group comprising his father and his father's m trading partners. Under a conventional structure of payoffs, it is shown that a large span of interaction is detrimental to the long-run coexistence of cooperation and defection, and conditions are provided under which the social outcome associated with the expansion of trade when individuals trade with a few is better than that when they trade with many. Under the stipulated conditions it is shown, by means of a static comparative analysis of the steady state configurations of the farmer population, that an expansion of the market can be beneficial in one context, detrimental in another. Springer-Verlag, 2010 Local interaction nationallicence Span of interaction nationallicence Imitation nationallicence Cooperation nationallicence Social welfare nationallicence Stark Oded University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113, Bonn, Germany aut Behrens Doris University of Klagenfurt, Universitaetsstrasse 65-67, 9020, Klagenfurt, Austria aut Journal of Evolutionary Economics Springer-Verlag 21/5(2011-12-01), 721-736 0936-9937 21:5<721 2011 21 191 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-010-0182-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-010-0182-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Stark Oded University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113, Bonn, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Behrens Doris University of Klagenfurt, Universitaetsstrasse 65-67, 9020, Klagenfurt, Austria aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Evolutionary Economics Springer-Verlag 21/5(2011-12-01), 721-736 0936-9937 21:5<721 2011 21 191 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer