<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">445854545</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20180317145424.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">170323e20110501xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s00191-010-0197-x</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00191-010-0197-x</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Individually selecting among conventions - an evolutionary and experimental analysis</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Susanne Büchner, Werner Güth, Luis Miller]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Conventions can be narrowly interpreted as coordinated ways of equilibrium play, telling all players which of possibly several equilibria to play or more broadly how to choose in a game without imposing the equilibrium property. Since coordination often takes place before learning about the game, one has to coordinate on a prescribing principle. For the subclass of 2×2-bimatrix games with two strict equilibria, we analyze the evolutionary stability of various such principles. In our experiment, we allow participants to coordinate on principles before playing various games. Based on between-subjects treatments, participants do so being completely (they know neither their role nor the game parameters), partially (they know either their role or the game parameters) ignorant, or with no veil of ignorance (they know their role and the game parameters).</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer-Verlag, 2010</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Coordination games</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Conventions</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Experimental economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Evolutionary stability</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Büchner</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Susanne</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">International Max Planck Research School on Adapting Behavior in a Fundamentally Uncertain World, Kahlaische Str. 10, 07745, Jena, Germany</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Güth</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Werner</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Str. 10, 07745, Jena, Germany</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Miller</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Luis</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, New Road, OX1 1NF, Oxford, UK</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Journal of Evolutionary Economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer-Verlag</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">21/2(2011-05-01), 285-301</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0936-9937</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">21:2&lt;285</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2011</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">21</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">191</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-010-0197-x</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-010-0197-x</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Büchner</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Susanne</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">International Max Planck Research School on Adapting Behavior in a Fundamentally Uncertain World, Kahlaische Str. 10, 07745, Jena, Germany</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Güth</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Werner</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Str. 10, 07745, Jena, Germany</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Miller</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Luis</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, New Road, OX1 1NF, Oxford, UK</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Journal of Evolutionary Economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer-Verlag</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">21/2(2011-05-01), 285-301</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0936-9937</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">21:2&lt;285</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2011</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">21</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">191</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
