<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">445854596</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20180317145424.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">170323e20110501xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s10640-010-9426-x</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10640-010-9426-x</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Jaeger</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">William</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Oregon State University, 213 Ballard Extension Hall, 97331, Corvallis, OR, USA</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="4">
   <subfield code="a">The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[William Jaeger]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, marginal social damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the Pigouvian rate. Given these observations, the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first-best value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best environmental tax is lower than its first-best value, the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2010</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Double dividend</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Excess burden</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Optimal environmental tax</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Pigouvian rate</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Revenue recycling</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Second-best</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Tax base effect</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Tax interaction effect</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Environmental and Resource Economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Netherlands</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">49/1(2011-05-01), 101-119</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0924-6460</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">49:1&lt;101</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2011</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">49</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">10640</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9426-x</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9426-x</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">100</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Jaeger</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">William</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Oregon State University, 213 Ballard Extension Hall, 97331, Corvallis, OR, USA</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Environmental and Resource Economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Netherlands</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">49/1(2011-05-01), 101-119</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0924-6460</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">49:1&lt;101</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2011</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">49</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">10640</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
