caa a22 4500 44585491X CHVBK 20180317145425.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20110101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10640-010-9400-7 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10640-010-9400-7 van der Ploeg Frederick University of Oxford, Manor Road Building, OX13UQ, Oxford, UK aut Rapacious Resource Depletion, Excessive Investment and Insecure Property Rights: A Puzzle [Elektronische Daten] [Frederick van der Ploeg] For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The theory suggests that power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. Also, adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving. Since our theory suggests that genuine saving is zero while empirically they are negative in resource-rich, fractionalized countries, we suggest ways of resolving this puzzle. Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2010 Exhaustible resources nationallicence Hotelling rule nationallicence Hartwick rule nationallicence Capital nationallicence Sustainable consumption nationallicence Fractionalization nationallicence Seepage nationallicence Interconnected pools nationallicence Insecure property rights nationallicence Differential game nationallicence Genuine saving nationallicence Adjusted net saving nationallicence Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 48/1(2011-01-01), 105-128 0924-6460 48:1<105 2011 48 10640 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9400-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9400-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- van der Ploeg Frederick University of Oxford, Manor Road Building, OX13UQ, Oxford, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 48/1(2011-01-01), 105-128 0924-6460 48:1<105 2011 48 10640 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer