caa a22 4500 445855061 CHVBK 20190911090216.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20110401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10640-010-9416-z doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10640-010-9416-z The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem [Elektronische Daten] [Rupert Gatti, Timo Goeschl, Ben Groom, Timothy Swanson] We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash's ‘rational threats' idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions. Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2010 Biodiversity nationallicence Incremental costs nationallicence International environmental agreements nationallicence Nash cooperative bargaining nationallicence North-south bargaining nationallicence Rational threats nationallicence Gatti Rupert Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, CB3 9DD, Cambridge, UK aut Goeschl Timo Chair of Environmental Economics, Alfred Weber Institute, University of Heidelberg, 69115, Heidelberg, Germany aut Groom Ben Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies, WC1H 0XG, London, UK aut Swanson Timothy Hoffman Chair of Economics, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement, P.O. Box 136, 1211, Geneva 21, Switzerland aut Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 48/4(2011-04-01), 609-628 0924-6460 48:4<609 2011 48 10640 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9416-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-010-9416-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Gatti Rupert Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, CB3 9DD, Cambridge, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Goeschl Timo Chair of Environmental Economics, Alfred Weber Institute, University of Heidelberg, 69115, Heidelberg, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Groom Ben Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies, WC1H 0XG, London, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Swanson Timothy Hoffman Chair of Economics, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement, P.O. Box 136, 1211, Geneva 21, Switzerland aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 48/4(2011-04-01), 609-628 0924-6460 48:4<609 2011 48 10640 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer