caa a22 4500 445855282 CHVBK 20180317145426.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10640-011-9477-7 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10640-011-9477-7 Uncertainty, Learning and Heterogeneity in International Environmental Agreements [Elektronische Daten] [Charles Kolstad, Alistair Ulph] This paper concerns the formation of International Environmental Agreements under uncertainty about environmental damage with different models of learning (complete learning, partial learning or no learning). The results of the existing literature are generally pessimistic: the possibility of either complete or partial learning generally reduces the level of global welfare that can be achieved from forming an IEA relative to no learning. That literature regards uncertainty as a parameter common to all countries, so that countries are identical ex ante as well as ex post. In this paper we extend the literature to the case where there is no correlation between damage costs across countries; each country is uncertain about a particular parameter (in our case the benefit-cost ratio) drawn from a common distribution but, ex post, each country's realized parameter value is independently drawn. Consequently, while countries remain identical ex ante, they may be heterogeneous ex post. We show that this change reinforces the negative conclusions about the effects of partial learning on international environmental agreements, but, under certain conditions, moderates the negative conclusions about the effects of complete learning. Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2011 International environmental agreements nationallicence Voluntary contributions to public goods nationallicence Climate change nationallicence Kolstad Charles Department of Economics and Bren School, University of California, 93110, Santa Barbara, CA, USA aut Ulph Alistair Sustainable Consumption Institute, University of Manchester, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK aut Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 50/3(2011-11-01), 389-403 0924-6460 50:3<389 2011 50 10640 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9477-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9477-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kolstad Charles Department of Economics and Bren School, University of California, 93110, Santa Barbara, CA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ulph Alistair Sustainable Consumption Institute, University of Manchester, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 50/3(2011-11-01), 389-403 0924-6460 50:3<389 2011 50 10640 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer