caa a22 4500 445855339 CHVBK 20180317145426.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10640-011-9481-y doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10640-011-9481-y The Cost-Effective Choice of Policy Instruments to Cap Aggregate Emissions with Costly Enforcement [Elektronische Daten] [Marcelo Caffera, Carlos Chávez] We study the cost-effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost-effectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits. Our analysis considers abatement, monitoring and sanctioning costs, as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters' abatement costs. Under perfect information we find that (a) the total-cost-effective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are firm specific and perfectly enforced, and (b) the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system, except under special conditions. This is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not. Under imperfect information, nevertheless, it is only by implementing a system of tradable permits and perfectly enforcing it with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits, that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty. Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2011 Environmental policy nationallicence Cost-effectiveness nationallicence Enforcement costs nationallicence Monitoring costs nationallicence Caffera Marcelo Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Montevideo, Prudencio de Pena 2440, 11600, Montevideo, Uruguay aut Chávez Carlos Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción, Concepción, Chile aut Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 50/4(2011-12-01), 531-557 0924-6460 50:4<531 2011 50 10640 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9481-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9481-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Caffera Marcelo Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Montevideo, Prudencio de Pena 2440, 11600, Montevideo, Uruguay aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Chávez Carlos Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción, Concepción, Chile aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 50/4(2011-12-01), 531-557 0924-6460 50:4<531 2011 50 10640 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer