caa a22 4500 445855428 CHVBK 20180317145426.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20111001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10640-011-9474-x doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10640-011-9474-x Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs [Elektronische Daten] [Carmen Arguedas, Daan van Soest] An increasing number of environmental protection programs offers financial compensation to farmers in exchange for conservation services. Incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but the extant literature suggests that outcomes are always second-best so that other instruments (such as conservation auctions) may be preferred. We argue that the claim regarding the first-best solution never being incentive-compatible is correct if all conservation costs are variable in nature; if there are fixed costs too, the first-best compensation scheme may be incentive-compatible after all. Given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation issues, we conclude that incentive-compatible contracts should be given a second chance as a policy measure to induce conservation. The Author(s), 2011 Asymmetric information nationallicence Payments for ecosystem services nationallicence Mechanism design nationallicence Arguedas Carmen Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia Económica, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain aut van Soest Daan Department of Spatial Economics and IVM, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 50/2(2011-10-01), 305-323 0924-6460 50:2<305 2011 50 10640 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9474-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9474-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Arguedas Carmen Departamento de Análisis Económico, Teoría Económica e Historia Económica, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- van Soest Daan Department of Spatial Economics and IVM, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Environmental and Resource Economics Springer Netherlands 50/2(2011-10-01), 305-323 0924-6460 50:2<305 2011 50 10640 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer