caa a22 4500 445862866 CHVBK 20180317145448.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20110501xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10997-009-9096-7 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10997-009-9096-7 Is corporate governance different for the Lebanese banking system? [Elektronische Daten] [Salim Chahine, Assem Safieddine] This paper investigates the effect of board size and its composition on bank's performance in an emerging context. This study includes 749 firm years of data on the banking industry in Lebanon from 1992 to 2006. The data contains all nationwide banks in operation in any year over the studied period. Since some banks entered and/or exited over the sample period, there is an unbalanced panel data, where an Ordinary Least Squares regression may create problems of interpretation. Within this framework, we use a fixed-effect model which produces unbiased and consistent estimates of the coefficients. This paper reports that bank performance is positively related to board size. It also identifies a quadratic relationship between bank performance and board independence. Both return-on-assets and return-on-equity first decrease and then increase in direct proportion to the increased percentage of outside directors on the board. This paper sheds some light on the differential impact of corporate governance on firm performance across industries and countries. It concentrates on banks in developing countries that are generally known to suffer from high asymmetric information and where concerns about safety and soundness remain. Hence, it contributes to the existing debate on appropriate regulations for an effective and stable financial system in the Arab world. Also, it complements the Basel Committee standards for bank supervision and capital adequacy reinforcement, and offers regulators some evidence on the relationship between board size and bank performance in a developing country such as Lebanon. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC., 2009 Emerging market corporate governance nationallicence Corporate governance of banks in developing economies nationallicence Role of commercial banks nationallicence Board representation nationallicence Board characteristics nationallicence Internal control mechanism nationallicence Lebanese corporate governance system nationallicence Chahine Salim The Suliman Olayan School of Business, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon aut Safieddine Assem The Suliman Olayan School of Business, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon aut Journal of Management & Governance Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 15/2(2011-05-01), 207-226 1385-3457 15:2<207 2011 15 10997 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-009-9096-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-009-9096-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Chahine Salim The Suliman Olayan School of Business, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Safieddine Assem The Suliman Olayan School of Business, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Management & Governance Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 15/2(2011-05-01), 207-226 1385-3457 15:2<207 2011 15 10997 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer