caa a22 4500 445862890 CHVBK 20180317145448.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20110501xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10997-009-9095-8 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10997-009-9095-8 CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions [Elektronische Daten] [Eahab Elsaid, Wallace Davidson III, Xiaoxin Wang] We propose that outside CEO candidates will have greater bargaining power than insiders. As a result, outside CEO successors will likely receive greater total compensation than inside CEO successors. Outside successors, meantime, pose more risk to the hiring firm than inside successors due to higher information asymmetry. As a result, outside successor compensation packages are tilted towards more performance-related pay-at-risk, while inside successor packages have a higher percentage in salary. In addition, outside successors may want to utilize the structure of their compensation at their previous firm in their new contracts. Using a sample of 99 firms with outside successors who were not CEO in their prior firms, matched by industry and size to firms that hired inside candidates, we find evidence supporting these hypotheses. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC., 2009 Corporate governance nationallicence CEO compensation nationallicence Inside and outside CEO successor nationallicence Elsaid Eahab Accounting and Finance Department, University of Windsor, N9B 3P4, Windsor, ON, Canada aut Davidson III Wallace Department of Finance: Mail Code 4626, College of Business and Administration, Southern Illinois University, 62901, Carbondale, IL, USA aut Wang Xiaoxin Department of Finance: Mail Code 4626, College of Business and Administration, Southern Illinois University, 62901, Carbondale, IL, USA aut Journal of Management & Governance Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 15/2(2011-05-01), 187-205 1385-3457 15:2<187 2011 15 10997 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-009-9095-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-009-9095-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Elsaid Eahab Accounting and Finance Department, University of Windsor, N9B 3P4, Windsor, ON, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Davidson III Wallace Department of Finance: Mail Code 4626, College of Business and Administration, Southern Illinois University, 62901, Carbondale, IL, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Wang Xiaoxin Department of Finance: Mail Code 4626, College of Business and Administration, Southern Illinois University, 62901, Carbondale, IL, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Management & Governance Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 15/2(2011-05-01), 187-205 1385-3457 15:2<187 2011 15 10997 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer