caa a22 4500 445887605 CHVBK 20180317145604.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170323e20110301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10726-009-9174-x doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10726-009-9174-x Billot Antoine Université Panthéon-Assas and PSE-Ecole d'Economic de Paris, Paris 2, 92 rue d'Assas, 75006, Paris, France aut Are Choice Rationality and Social Consistency Two Sides of a Same Coin? [Elektronische Daten] [Antoine Billot] This paper aims at proving that a society cannot be consistent if it is constituted of decision-makers who are not rational. For that purpose, we propose to justify social interactions by means of individual preferences. More precisely, we establish that individual choice rationality is logically equivalent, i.e. is a necessary and sufficient condition, to social consistency—when individual rationality means that preferences are completely ordered (as in standard microeconomics) and social consistency that there is a one-to-one mapping from the list of actual communities to the underlying particular interaction (unique, reflexive and symmetric) between all individuals of the society. Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2009 Preferences nationallicence Social interaction nationallicence Communities nationallicence Group Decision and Negotiation Springer Netherlands 20/2(2011-03-01), 239-254 0926-2644 20:2<239 2011 20 10726 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9174-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9174-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Billot Antoine Université Panthéon-Assas and PSE-Ecole d'Economic de Paris, Paris 2, 92 rue d'Assas, 75006, Paris, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Group Decision and Negotiation Springer Netherlands 20/2(2011-03-01), 239-254 0926-2644 20:2<239 2011 20 10726 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer