caa a22 4500 463169115 CHVBK 20180406164808.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10957-007-9240-y doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10957-007-9240-y Yeung D. Center for Game Theory, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong aut Dynamically Consistent Cooperative Solution inaDifferential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution [Elektronische Daten] [D. Yeung] This paper presents a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution. A noted feature of the game model is that the industrial sectors remain competitive among themselves while the governments cooperate in pollution abatement. It is the first time that time consistent solutions are derived in a cooperative differential game on pollution control with industries and governments being separate entities. A stochastic version of the model is presented and a subgame-consistent cooperative solution is provided. This is the first study of pollution management in a stochastic differential game framework. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2007 Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers; http://www.springer-ny.com 134/1(2007-07-01), 143-160 0022-3239 134:1<143 2007 134 10957 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-007-9240-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-007-9240-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Yeung D. Center for Game Theory, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers; http://www.springer-ny.com 134/1(2007-07-01), 143-160 0022-3239 134:1<143 2007 134 10957 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer