caa a22 4500 463173864 CHVBK 20180406164820.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0189-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0189-9 Distribution-neutral provision of public goods [Elektronische Daten] [Udo Ebert, Georg Tillmann] The paper describes a normative approach to budget incidence, given the provision of a public good. The objective is to balance the budget by an income tax such that the budget is distribution-neutral. This property requires that every consumer's net welfare gain, i.e. the benefit from consuming the public good and the tax burden in financing it, does not change the inequality inherent in the income distribution. The properties of the distribution-neutral tax are investigated and completely determined. The marginal willingness to pay for the public good is decisive for the degree of progression of the tax schedule. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Ebert Udo Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, 26111, Oldenburg, Germany aut Tillmann Georg Department of Economics, University of Mainz, 55128, Mainz, Germany aut Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/1(2007-07-01), 107-124 0176-1714 29:1<107 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0189-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0189-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ebert Udo Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, 26111, Oldenburg, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Tillmann Georg Department of Economics, University of Mainz, 55128, Mainz, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/1(2007-07-01), 107-124 0176-1714 29:1<107 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer