caa a22 4500 463173880 CHVBK 20180406164820.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0199-7 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0199-7 Political election on legal retirement age [Elektronische Daten] [Juan Lacomba, Francisco Lagos] In the context of the current debate surrounding the reform of pension systems, this paper analyzes the political economy of the legal retirement age. Using a life-cycle model in which individuals differ by age and by wage, we analyze the outcome of a majority voting process on the legal retirement age in a Pay-As-You-Go pension system. The results show that the older an individual is, the closer her optimal retirement age is to the status quo age. That is, the status quo retirement age acts as a magnet. Additionally, we find that the preferred legal retirement age of most of the working population increases when the pension system is more redistributive. We also observe a positive relationship between the preferred legal retirement age and the status quo age. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Lacomba Juan CEA and Lineex, Faculty of Economics, University of Granada, Granada, Spain aut Lagos Francisco CEA and Lineex, Faculty of Economics, University of Granada, Granada, Spain aut Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/1(2007-07-01), 1-17 0176-1714 29:1<1 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0199-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0199-7 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Lacomba Juan CEA and Lineex, Faculty of Economics, University of Granada, Granada, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Lagos Francisco CEA and Lineex, Faculty of Economics, University of Granada, Granada, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/1(2007-07-01), 1-17 0176-1714 29:1<1 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer