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   <subfield code="a">In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using &quot;systematicity” and &quot;independence” conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow's theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby provide a new proof of Arrow's theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation, and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.</subfield>
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