caa a22 4500 463173945 CHVBK 20180406164820.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20071001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0209-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0209-9 Vartiainen Hannu Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, Ludviginkatu 3-5, 00130, Helsinki, Finland aut Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms [Elektronische Daten] [Hannu Vartiainen] We characterize completely ordinal and onto choice rules that are subgame perfect of Nash equilibrium (SPE) implementable via randomized mechanisms under strict preferences. The characterization is very operationalizable, and allows us to analyse SPE implementability of voting rules. We show that no scoring rule is SPE implementable. However, the top-cycle and the uncovered correspondences as well as plurality with runoff and any strongly Condorcet consistent voting rule can be SPE implemented. Therefore our results are favourable to majority based voting rules over scoring rules. Nevertheless, we show that many interesting Condorcet consistent but not strongly Condorcet consistent rules, such as the Copeland rule, the Kramer rule and the Simpson rule, cannot be SPE implemented. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/3(2007-10-01), 353-367 0176-1714 29:3<353 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0209-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0209-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Vartiainen Hannu Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, Ludviginkatu 3-5, 00130, Helsinki, Finland aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/3(2007-10-01), 353-367 0176-1714 29:3<353 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer