caa a22 4500 463173996 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20071001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-007-0219-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-007-0219-2 Yu Yan Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong aut Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units [Elektronische Daten] [Yan Yu] This paper characterizes serial mechanisms for the cost sharing of an excludable public good that is available in multiple units. We show that serial mechanisms are the only voluntary mechanisms that satisfy coalition strategy-proofness and consumer sovereignty. Springer-Verlag, 2007 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/3(2007-10-01), 539-555 0176-1714 29:3<539 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0219-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0219-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Yu Yan Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/3(2007-10-01), 539-555 0176-1714 29:3<539 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer