caa a22 4500 463174003 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20071001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-007-0215-6 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-007-0215-6 First and second best voting rules in committees [Elektronische Daten] [Ruth Ben-Yashar, Igal Milchtaich] A committee of people with common preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) votes in order to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes the different individual competences into account, and is therefore not anonymous, i.e., the voters' identities matter. Under this rule, it is rational for the committee members to vote according to their true opinions, or informatively. This is not necessarily true for an anonymous voting rule, under which members may have an incentive to vote non-informatively. Thus, strategic, sophisticated voters may vary their voting strategies according to the voting rule rather than naively voting informatively. This paper shows that the identity of the best anonymous and monotone (i.e., quota) voting rule does not depend on whether the committee members are strategic or naive or whether some are strategic and some are naive. One such rule, called the second best rule, affords the highest expected utility in all cases. "Wasn't he sweet?” said Yossarian. "Maybe they should give him three votes.” Joseph Heller, Catch-22 Springer-Verlag, 2007 Ben-Yashar Ruth Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900, Ramat-Gan, Israel aut Milchtaich Igal Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900, Ramat-Gan, Israel aut Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/3(2007-10-01), 453-486 0176-1714 29:3<453 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0215-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0215-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ben-Yashar Ruth Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900, Ramat-Gan, Israel aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Milchtaich Igal Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900, Ramat-Gan, Israel aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/3(2007-10-01), 453-486 0176-1714 29:3<453 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer