caa a22 4500 46317402X CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20071001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0211-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0211-2 Roberts Kevin Nuffield College, OX1 1NF, Oxford, UK aut Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting [Elektronische Daten] [Kevin Roberts] An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly. Intertemporal voting simplifies the strategic issues and the agenda setting is as unrestricted as possible. Voters adopt Markov strategies. The possibility of cycles is examined, both in the intertemporal extension to the Condorcet paradox and in more general examples. The set of possibilities is rich, as is demonstrated by an exhaustive study of a three-person, three-state world. Equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist but a weakening of the equilibrium concept to admit probabilistic voting allows a general existence result to be proved. The analysis leads to the development of a dominant state which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/3(2007-10-01), 383-404 0176-1714 29:3<383 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0211-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0211-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Roberts Kevin Nuffield College, OX1 1NF, Oxford, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/3(2007-10-01), 383-404 0176-1714 29:3<383 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer