caa a22 4500 463174097 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20071201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-007-0251-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-007-0251-2 Weirich Paul Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, 65211, Columbia, MO, USA aut Collective, universal, and joint rationality [Elektronische Daten] [Paul Weirich] Rationality's extension from individuals to groups yields collective rationality. Just as individuals should be rational, groups should be collectively rational. This paper briefly presents collective rationality and then compares it to universal rationality and joint rationality. Universal rationality is the rationality of all members of a group. It directs individualistic evaluation of a collective act. Joint rationality is the rationality of each individual's part in a collective act given the collective act's realization. Game theory uses it to characterize solutions to games. Collective rationality is not the same as either universal or joint rationality. However, in certain ideal conditions collective rationality agrees with universal rationality, and in other ideal conditions it agrees with joint rationality. Distinguishing the three types of evaluation and explaining their relations contributes to a general theory of rationality. Springer-Verlag, 2007 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/4(2007-12-01), 683-701 0176-1714 29:4<683 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0251-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0251-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Weirich Paul Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, 65211, Columbia, MO, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/4(2007-12-01), 683-701 0176-1714 29:4<683 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer