caa a22 4500 463174119 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0203-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0203-2 Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment [Elektronische Daten] [Arnaud Dellis, Mandar Oak] Proponents of Approval Voting argue that this electoral rule leads to more centrist outcomes compared to Plurality Voting. This claim has been substantiated by scholarly work using spatial models of political competition. We revisit this issue in the context of a model of political competition in which (1) candidates are policy-motivated; (2) candidacy decisions are endogenous; and (3) candidates can credibly commit to implementing any policy. Under these assumptions we find the opposite to be true-Plurality Voting yields convergence to the median voter's ideal policy but Approval Voting may not. We argue that this result is driven by the differential incentives for candidate entry under the two voting rules. Our results suggest that whether Approval Voting yields more centrist outcomes vis-á-vis Plurality Voting depends on the possibility of policy commitment on the part of the candidates. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Dellis Arnaud Department of Economics, University of Hawaii - Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, 96822, Honolulu, HI, USA aut Oak Mandar Department of Economics, Williams College, Morey House, 01267, Williamstown, MA, USA aut Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/2(2007-09-01), 229-245 0176-1714 29:2<229 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0203-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0203-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Dellis Arnaud Department of Economics, University of Hawaii - Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, 96822, Honolulu, HI, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Oak Mandar Department of Economics, Williams College, Morey House, 01267, Williamstown, MA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/2(2007-09-01), 229-245 0176-1714 29:2<229 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer