caa a22 4500 463174143 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3 Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity [Elektronische Daten] [Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken] This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function for three alternatives is manipulable. The lower bound is derived and examples of social choice functions attaining the lower bound are given. It is conjectured that these social choice functions are in fact all minimally manipulable social choice functions. Since some of these social choice functions are Pareto optimal, it follows that the lower bound also holds for Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. Some of the minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions can be interpreted as status quo voting. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Maus Stefan Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, Maastricht, MD, The Netherlands aut Peters Hans Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, Maastricht, MD, The Netherlands aut Storcken Ton Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, Maastricht, MD, The Netherlands aut Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/2(2007-09-01), 247-269 0176-1714 29:2<247 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0202-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Maus Stefan Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, Maastricht, MD, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Peters Hans Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, Maastricht, MD, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Storcken Ton Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, Maastricht, MD, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/2(2007-09-01), 247-269 0176-1714 29:2<247 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer