caa a22 4500 46317416X CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0201-4 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0201-4 de Clippel Geoffroy Department of Economics, Rice University, 6100 Main Street, 77005, Houston, TX, USA aut An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution [Elektronische Daten] [Geoffroy de Clippel] I prove that ‘Disagreement Point Convexity' and ‘Midpoint Domination' characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of two-player bargaining problems and on the class of smooth bargaining problems. I propose an example to show that these two axioms do not characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of bargaining problems with more than two players. I prove that the other solutions that satisfy these two properties are not lower hemi-continuous. These different results refine the analysis of Chun (Econ Lett 34:311-316, 1990). I also highlight a rather unexpected link with the result of Dagan etal. (Soc Choice Welfare 19:811-823, 2002). Springer-Verlag, 2006 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/2(2007-09-01), 201-210 0176-1714 29:2<201 2007 29 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0201-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0201-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- de Clippel Geoffroy Department of Economics, Rice University, 6100 Main Street, 77005, Houston, TX, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 29/2(2007-09-01), 201-210 0176-1714 29:2<201 2007 29 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer