caa a22 4500 463174216 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0156-5 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0156-5 Porteiro Nicolás Departamento de Economía, Met. Cuantitativos e Ha Económica, Area de Análisis Económico, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Carretera Utrera km 1, 41013, Sevilla, Spain aut An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities [Elektronische Daten] [Nicolás Porteiro] We construct a simple mechanism that can be used in situations when a group of well informed agents try to cooperate in the production and allocation of a good with external effects. We start by auctioning the right to have the initiative in the negotiation, then the winner proposes an allocation that is implemented if the rest of the players unanimously accept it. In case of a rejection, the process is started again. We show that the outcome of any stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium leads to an efficient allocation of the good with externalities, together with an equal split of the surplus that cooperation generates. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/1(2007-01-01), 19-40 0176-1714 28:1<19 2007 28 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0156-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0156-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Porteiro Nicolás Departamento de Economía, Met. Cuantitativos e Ha Económica, Area de Análisis Económico, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Carretera Utrera km 1, 41013, Sevilla, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/1(2007-01-01), 19-40 0176-1714 28:1<19 2007 28 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer