caa a22 4500 463174240 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6 Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU [Elektronische Daten] [Francesco Passarelli, Jason Barr] In this paper, we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen in Manage Sci 18:p64-p72, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players' voting "yes” for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player's power. We demonstrate these results using data from the European Union to show how the power distribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Passarelli Francesco Coste Sant' Agostino, DTSO, University of Teramo, 64100, Teramo, Italy aut Barr Jason Department of Economics, Rutgers University, NJ, 07102, Newark, USA aut Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/1(2007-01-01), 41-60 0176-1714 28:1<41 2007 28 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Passarelli Francesco Coste Sant' Agostino, DTSO, University of Teramo, 64100, Teramo, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Barr Jason Department of Economics, Rutgers University, NJ, 07102, Newark, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/1(2007-01-01), 41-60 0176-1714 28:1<41 2007 28 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer