caa a22 4500 463174267 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0158-3 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0158-3 Bochet Olivier Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms [Elektronische Daten] [Olivier Bochet] Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. Define a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When preferences over alternatives are strict, we show that Maskin monotonicity (Maskin in Rev Econ stud 66: 23-38, 1999) is both necessary and sufficient for a social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable. We discuss how to relax the assumption of strict preferences. Next, we examine social choice correspondences with private components. Finally, we apply our method to the issue of voluntary implementation (Jackon and Palfrey in J Econ Theory 98: 1-25, 2001). Springer-Verlag, 2006 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/1(2007-01-01), 111-125 0176-1714 28:1<111 2007 28 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0158-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0158-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Bochet Olivier Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/1(2007-01-01), 111-125 0176-1714 28:1<111 2007 28 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer