caa a22 4500 463174321 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0179-y doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0179-y Monotonicity in Condorcet's Jury Theorem with dependent voters [Elektronische Daten] [Daniel Berend, Luba Sapir] Condorcet's Jury Theorem (CJT) provides a theoretical basis of public choice theory and political science. This paper provides an extension of CJT for random subcommittees consisting of dependent heterogeneous experts. Necessary and sufficient conditions for beneficial augmentation (reduction) of the size of a random subcommittee are provided. These results are applied in several dependency models. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Berend Daniel Departments of Mathematics and Computer Science, Ben-Gurion University, 84105, Beer-Sheva, Israel aut Sapir Luba Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University, 84105, Beer-Sheva, Israel aut Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/3(2007-04-01), 507-528 0176-1714 28:3<507 2007 28 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0179-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0179-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Berend Daniel Departments of Mathematics and Computer Science, Ben-Gurion University, 84105, Beer-Sheva, Israel aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sapir Luba Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University, 84105, Beer-Sheva, Israel aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/3(2007-04-01), 507-528 0176-1714 28:3<507 2007 28 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence SWISSBIB 463174321 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer