caa a22 4500 46317433X CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0182-3 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0182-3 Schofield Norman Center in Political Economy, Washington University in Saint Louis, 63130, St. Louis, MO, USA aut Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty [Elektronische Daten] [Norman Schofield] After an election, when party positions and strengths are known, there may be a centrally located large party at the core position. Theory suggests that such a core party is able to form a minority government and control policy. In the absence of a core party, theory suggests that the outcome be a lottery associated with coalition risk. Stochastic models of elections typically indicate that all parties, in equilibrium, will adopt positions at the electoral center. This paper first presents an existence theorem for local Nash equilibrium (LNE) under vote maximization, and then constructs a more general model using the notion of coalition risk. The model allows for the balancing of office and policy motivations. Empirical analyses of elections in the Netherlands and Israel are used as illustrations of the model and of the concept of a structurally stable LNE. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/3(2007-04-01), 461-490 0176-1714 28:3<461 2007 28 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0182-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0182-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Schofield Norman Center in Political Economy, Washington University in Saint Louis, 63130, St. Louis, MO, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/3(2007-04-01), 461-490 0176-1714 28:3<461 2007 28 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer