caa a22 4500 463174356 CHVBK 20180406164821.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives [Elektronische Daten] [Özgür Kıbrıs, Murat Sertel] We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for "good" ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Kıbrıs Özgür Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Orhanli, Tuzla, 34956, Istanbul, Turkey aut Sertel Murat Department of Economics, Koç Üniversity, Rumelifeneri Yolu, 34450, Istanbul, Sarı yer, Turkey aut Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/3(2007-04-01), 421-437 0176-1714 28:3<421 2007 28 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kıbrıs Özgür Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Orhanli, Tuzla, 34956, Istanbul, Turkey aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sertel Murat Department of Economics, Koç Üniversity, Rumelifeneri Yolu, 34450, Istanbul, Sarı yer, Turkey aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/3(2007-04-01), 421-437 0176-1714 28:3<421 2007 28 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer