caa a22 4500 463174445 CHVBK 20180406164822.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0185-0 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0185-0 van Hees Martin Department of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712, Groningen, GL, The Netherlands aut The limits of epistemic democracy [Elektronische Daten] [Martin van Hees] The so-called doctrinal paradox reveals that a jury that decides by majority on the truth of a set of propositions, may come to a conclusion that is at odds with a legal doctrine to which they all subscribe. The doctrinal paradox, and its subsequent generalization by List and Pettit (Econ Philos 18:89-110, 2002), reveal the logical difficulties of epistemic democracy. This paper presents several generalizations of the paradox that are formulated with the use of many-valued logic. The results show that allowing the individual or the collective judgements to be formulated in terms of degrees of beliefs does not ensure the possibility of collective epistemic decision making. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/4(2007-06-01), 649-666 0176-1714 28:4<649 2007 28 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0185-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0185-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- van Hees Martin Department of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712, Groningen, GL, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/4(2007-06-01), 649-666 0176-1714 28:4<649 2007 28 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer