caa a22 4500 46317447X CHVBK 20180406164822.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0184-1 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0184-1 Zank Horst Economics, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK aut Social welfare functions with a reference income [Elektronische Daten] [Horst Zank] A foundation of social welfare functions is considered with a given reference income (or utility): relative and absolute invariance of the underlying welfare ordering are defined to hold for societies with either all members having incomes below the reference income or all members having incomes above the reference income. These conditions, alongside standard properties of a social preference relation, provide reference income dependent extensions of traditional classes of welfare functions. Dalton's principle of positive transfers is incorporated, under which relative invariance leads to a class of piecewise (rank-)linear welfare functions, including the class of generalized Gini social welfare functions as a special case. To ensure quasi-concavity a new preference condition is proposed, which has the interpretation of aversion to income dropping below the reference income. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/4(2007-06-01), 609-636 0176-1714 28:4<609 2007 28 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0184-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0184-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Zank Horst Economics, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/4(2007-06-01), 609-636 0176-1714 28:4<609 2007 28 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer