caa a22 4500 463174518 CHVBK 20180406164822.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170326e20070201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00355-006-0171-6 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00355-006-0171-6 On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members [Elektronische Daten] [Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean-Louis Rouet] Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Springer-Verlag, 2006 Feix Marc Ecole des Mines de Nantes, SUBATECH, La chanterie, 4 rue A Kastler, BP 20722, 44307, Nantes cedex 3, France aut Lepelley Dominique CERESUR, Department of Economics, Université de la Réunion, 97715, Saint-Denis cedex 9, France aut Merlin Vincent Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management (CREM), UMR6211 CNRS/Université de Caen, MRSH bureau 230, Esplanade de la Paix, 14032, Caen cedex, France aut Rouet Jean-Louis Laboratoire de Mathématique, Applications et Physique Mathématique - UMR 6628, Université d'Orléans, UFR des Sciences, 45067, Orléans Cedex 2, France aut Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/2(2007-02-01), 181-207 0176-1714 28:2<181 2007 28 355 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0171-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0171-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Feix Marc Ecole des Mines de Nantes, SUBATECH, La chanterie, 4 rue A Kastler, BP 20722, 44307, Nantes cedex 3, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Lepelley Dominique CERESUR, Department of Economics, Université de la Réunion, 97715, Saint-Denis cedex 9, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Merlin Vincent Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management (CREM), UMR6211 CNRS/Université de Caen, MRSH bureau 230, Esplanade de la Paix, 14032, Caen cedex, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Rouet Jean-Louis Laboratoire de Mathématique, Applications et Physique Mathématique - UMR 6628, Université d'Orléans, UFR des Sciences, 45067, Orléans Cedex 2, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Social Choice and Welfare Springer-Verlag 28/2(2007-02-01), 181-207 0176-1714 28:2<181 2007 28 355 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer