caa a22 4500 46577492X CHVBK 20180323111939.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170327e19901201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02204849 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02204849 Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation [Elektronische Daten] [Sven Berg, Dominique Lepelley] In this note, we investigate the connection between the existence of cycles and the opportunities of strategic manipulation under a specific social decision function, the plurality rule. Contrary to previous research in this field, voting cycles are considered as a possible cause rather than a consequence of strategic voting. The results we obtain allow us to evaluate the vulnerability of the plurality rule to strategic voting, and to study how the distribution of voters over preference orderings affects the risk of manipulation. J.C. Baltzer AG, Scientific Publishing Company, 1990 Berg Sven Department of Statistics, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden aut Lepelley Dominique CREMERC (URA CNRS D1273), University of Caen, F-14032, Caen, France aut Annals of Operations Research Baltzer Science Publishers, Baarn/Kluwer Academic Publishers 23/1(1990-12-01), 247-256 0254-5330 23:1<247 1990 23 10479 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02204849 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02204849 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Berg Sven Department of Statistics, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Lepelley Dominique CREMERC (URA CNRS D1273), University of Caen, F-14032, Caen, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Annals of Operations Research Baltzer Science Publishers, Baarn/Kluwer Academic Publishers 23/1(1990-12-01), 247-256 0254-5330 23:1<247 1990 23 10479 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer