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   <subfield code="a">Policies to change the priority of claimants: The case of depositor preference laws</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Depositor preference laws have been proposed to reduce the cost of bank failures to the deposit insurance agencies. This article shows how depositor preference rules change the payoff functions for bank creditors, including the deposit insurer, depositors, and nondepositor claimants. The adoption of depositor preference laws would appear to make nondepositors worse off, but they can improve their standing by collateralizing their claims. If a large enough proportion of nondepositor claims becomes collateralized, depositor preference could increase the cost of bank failure to the deposit insurance agency. Empirical analysis indicates that depositor preference will induce a substantial increase in collateralization, eliminating a significant share of the savings envisioned for the deposit insurer. Depositor preference will also reduce interest rates on uninsured deposits.</subfield>
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