caa a22 4500 465802907 CHVBK 20180323112057.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170327e19900101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02423833 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02423833 Johnson David Department of Philosophy, York University, M3J IP3, North York, Ontario, Canada aut Can abstractions be causes? [Elektronische Daten] [David Johnson] The Empiricist or Lockean view says natural kinds do not exist objectively in nature but are practical categories reflecting use of words. The Modern, Ostensive view says they do exist, and one can refer to such a kind by ostention and recursion, assuming his designation of it is related causally to the kind itself. However, this leads to a problem: Kinds are abstract repeatables, and it seems impossible that abstractions could have causal force. In defence of the Modern view, I suggest we can think of kinds as — or as like — ecological niches existing in nature, which are causally effective by virtue of the fact that they predictively determine (some) properties of the things that happen to occupy them. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990 Natural kinds nationallicence abstractions nationallicence causality nationallicence ecological niches nationallicence Biology and Philosophy Kluwer Academic Publishers 5/1(1990-01-01), 63-77 0169-3867 5:1<63 1990 5 10539 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02423833 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02423833 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Johnson David Department of Philosophy, York University, M3J IP3, North York, Ontario, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Biology and Philosophy Kluwer Academic Publishers 5/1(1990-01-01), 63-77 0169-3867 5:1<63 1990 5 10539 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer