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   <subfield code="a">Foundational explorations for a normative theory of political economy</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Edward McClennen]</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">I set out an individualistic and pragmatic choice framework for a normative theory of political economy, and argue that, given pluralism with respect to individual ends, a consensus on any political or economic institution presupposes that it is perceived to serve as a public means to private ends. Concerning the crucial question of the distribution of the benefits that political and economic cooperation can make possible, I argue that the various models typically employed—those pertaining to competitive market interaction, decision making under uncertainty, bargaining theory, and social choice theory—fail to provide for a stable consensus, i.e., one that is resistant to non-compliance and renegotiation. Since, however, such instabilities are mutually disadvantageous, these approaches fail to establish how rational individuals can capture all the gains that cooperation makes possible. Appealing to a modified version of the social-psychological construction that Rawls introduces in chapter 8 ofA Theory of Justice I argue that stability is a function of a perceived sense of mutual concern. I conclude by arguing that Rawls own egalitarian/efficiency principle gives natural expression to such a concern, and thus can serve as the object of a stable consensus.</subfield>
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