caa a22 4500 465809065 CHVBK 20180323112111.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170327e19900901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02393242 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02393242 Wärneryd Karl Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, S-113 83, Stockholm, Sweden aut Conventions: An evolutionary approach [Elektronische Daten] [Karl Wärneryd] Conventions are social institutions that solve recurrent coordination problems. In normative game theory, coordination games are considered problematic because of the multiplicity of equilibria. From a neoinstitutionalist perspective, however, this multiplicity should be an important part of the explanation of real-world institutions. The paper discusses the evolutionary (or "positive”) game-theoretical approach to the emergence of conventions. I note a precise sense in which conventions may be said to minimize transaction costs, but that they need not be efficient. Example applications to language, money, and the theory of the firm are discussed. George Mason University, 1990 Constitutional Political Economy Kluwer Academic Publishers 1/3(1990-09-01), 83-107 1043-4062 1:3<83 1990 1 10602 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393242 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393242 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Wärneryd Karl Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, S-113 83, Stockholm, Sweden aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Constitutional Political Economy Kluwer Academic Publishers 1/3(1990-09-01), 83-107 1043-4062 1:3<83 1990 1 10602 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer