caa a22 4500 465809073 CHVBK 20180323112111.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170327e19900901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02393241 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02393241 Spindler Z. Simon Fraser University, V5A 1S6, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada aut Constitutional design for a rent-seeking society: Voting rule choice [Elektronische Daten] [Z. Spindler] If rent-seeking costs are considered in addition to, and separate from, external costs and decision costs in Buchanan and Tullock's economic theory of constitutions, total interdependence costs may have multiple local minima close to the decision-making extremes. As a result, the global minimum, which gives the optimal decision rule, may be much closer to "unanimity rule” or "individual rule” than to "simple majority rule”. Further, the comparison of the minimum total interdependence costs for the public sector with those for the private sector would only justify a smaller scope and size for the public sector than would be the case if rent-seeking costs were ignored. Finally, systematic variation in rent-seeking cost could account for dramatic regime shifts between dictatorship and democracy. George Mason University, 1990 Constitutional Political Economy Kluwer Academic Publishers 1/3(1990-09-01), 73-82 1043-4062 1:3<73 1990 1 10602 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393241 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393241 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Spindler Z. Simon Fraser University, V5A 1S6, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Constitutional Political Economy Kluwer Academic Publishers 1/3(1990-09-01), 73-82 1043-4062 1:3<73 1990 1 10602 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence SWISSBIB 465809073 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer