caa a22 4500 46580909X CHVBK 20180323112111.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170327e19900301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02393039 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02393039 Frey Bruno Institute for Empirical Economic Research, University of Zürich, Kleinstrasse 15, CH-8008, Zürich, Switzerland aut From paradoxes to social rules, or: How economics repeats itself [Elektronische Daten] [Bruno Frey] There is an analogy of how the paradox of aggregation (Arrow impossibility theorem) and the paradoxa of individual behavior (people decide inconsistently) have been approached in mainstream research. In both cases it is disregarded that paradoxa are part of social reality. A constitutional approach focussing on rules and institutions promises to yield more fruitful insights. George Mason University, 1990 Constitutional Political Economy Kluwer Academic Publishers 1/2(1990-03-01), 27-34 1043-4062 1:2<27 1990 1 10602 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393039 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393039 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Frey Bruno Institute for Empirical Economic Research, University of Zürich, Kleinstrasse 15, CH-8008, Zürich, Switzerland aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Constitutional Political Economy Kluwer Academic Publishers 1/2(1990-03-01), 27-34 1043-4062 1:2<27 1990 1 10602 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer