caa a22 4500 465809111 CHVBK 20180323112111.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170327e19900301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF02393042 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF02393042 Sugden Robert School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK aut Rules for choosing among public goods: A contractarian approach [Elektronische Daten] [Robert Sugden] This paper asks what rules for supplying and financing public goods would be chosen by individuals at the constitutional level. A new principle of decision-making is proposed. This separates decisions about how much to spend on public goods from decisions about how to allocate this spending among different public goods; the latter decision is made by allowing each individual to determine how his own tax payment will be spent. Analogies are drawn between this principle and proportional representation, tax relief for charities, and certain procedures for providing state support for political parties and churches. George Mason University, 1990 Constitutional Political Economy Kluwer Academic Publishers 1/2(1990-03-01), 63-82 1043-4062 1:2<63 1990 1 10602 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393042 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393042 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Sugden Robert School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Constitutional Political Economy Kluwer Academic Publishers 1/2(1990-03-01), 63-82 1043-4062 1:2<63 1990 1 10602 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer