caa a22 4500 465817076 CHVBK 20180323112126.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170327e19900601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00382840 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00382840 Pfeiffer Raymond Department of Philosophy, Delta College, University Center, 48710, Michigan, USA aut The central distinction in the theory of corporate moral personhood [Elektronische Daten] [Raymond Pfeiffer] Peter French has argued that conglomerate collectivities such as business corporations are moral persons and that aggregate collectivities such as lynch mobs are not. Two arguments are advanced to show that French's claim is flawed. First, the distinction between aggregates and conglomerates is, at best, a distinction of degree, not kind. Moreover, some aggregates show evidence of moral personhood. Second, French's criterion for distinguishing aggregates and conglomerates is based on inadequate grounds. Application of the criterion to specific cases requires an additional judgment of a pragmatic nature which undermines any attempt to demonstrate French's thesis that actual conglomerates are moral persons and aggregates are not. Thus, French's theory is seriously lacking both empirical basis and empirical relevance. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990 Journal of Business Ethics Kluwer Academic Publishers 9/6(1990-06-01), 473-480 0167-4544 9:6<473 1990 9 10551 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00382840 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00382840 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Pfeiffer Raymond Department of Philosophy, Delta College, University Center, 48710, Michigan, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Business Ethics Kluwer Academic Publishers 9/6(1990-06-01), 473-480 0167-4544 9:6<473 1990 9 10551 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer