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   <subfield code="a">Testing for the principal's monopsony power in agency contracts</subfield>
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   <subfield code="c">[Atsushi Inoue, Tomislav Vukina]</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">We develop a test for the presence of the monopsony power of the livestock integrator (principal) on the market for contract growers (agents) and estimate the model with the data on swine industry contract settlements. A natural test for the monopsony power of the principal would compare the estimated values of the marginal revenue products with the actual payments that agents receive for their services. The problem with implementing this approach comes from the fact that agents' abilities and actions are unobservable. Our approach is based on estimating the slope of the inverse supply function for grower input using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The model specifies the relationships between the observable consequences and unobservable grower characteristics imposing the first order conditions for principal's profit maximization. The results show that the null hypothesis of no market power cannot be rejected.</subfield>
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