caa a22 4500 467909849 CHVBK 20180406152846.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e20060301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10645-006-6483-1 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10645-006-6483-1 Cutler David Harvard University and NBER, Cambridge aut The Economics of Health System Payment [Elektronische Daten] [David Cutler] Summary: Health care takes up 10 to 15 percent of GDP in most countries. In this lecture, I consider the efficiency of the medical system, focusing on the potential for payment reform to increase efficiency. Traditionally, medical care reimbursement has been based on the quantity and intensity of the services provided. While this system encouraged valuable innovation, it failed when high quality is not achieved by increased quantity. In theory, a more efficient system could be achieved by paying for medical care on the basis of quality of care provided, not just quantity. I discuss the design of such a payment system and review the literature on how pay-for-performance systems have worked in practice. Cautious optimism about the potential for efficiency gains from payment reform is warranted. Springer, 2006 pay for performance nationallicence medical care nationallicence reimbursement nationallicence I11 nationallicence D02 nationallicence De Economist Kluwer Academic Publishers 154/1(2006-03-01), 1-18 0013-063X 154:1<1 2006 154 10645 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-006-6483-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-006-6483-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Cutler David Harvard University and NBER, Cambridge aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- De Economist Kluwer Academic Publishers 154/1(2006-03-01), 1-18 0013-063X 154:1<1 2006 154 10645 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer