caa a22 4500 46791852X CHVBK 20180406152909.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e20061101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10584-006-9070-1 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10584-006-9070-1 Modeling endogenous learning and imperfect competition effects in climate change economics [Elektronische Daten] [Laurent Viguier, Leonardo Barreto, Alain Haurie, Socrates Kypreos, Peter Rafaj] In this two-part paper we evaluate the effect of "endogenizing” technological learning and strategic behavior of agents in economic models used to assess climate change policies. In the first part we show the potential impact of R&D policies or demonstration and deployment (D&D) programs in the context of stringent stabilization scenarios. In the second part we show how game-theoretic methods can be implemented in climate change economic models to take into account three types of strategic interactions: (i) the market power of the countries benefiting from very low abatement costs on international markets for CO2 emissions, (ii) the strategic behavior of governments in the domestic allocation of CO2 emissions quotas, and (iii) the non-cooperative behavior of countries and regions in the burden sharing of CO2 concentration stabilization. The two topics of endogenous learning and game-theoretic approach to economic modeling are two manifestations of the need to take into account the strategic behavior of agents in the evaluation of climate change policies. In the first case an R&D policy or a demonstration and deployment (D&D) program are put in place in order to attain a cost reduction through the learning effect; in the second case the agents (countries) reply optimally to the actions decided by the other agents by exploiting their strategic advantages. Simulations based on integrated assessment models illustrate the approaches. These studies have been conducted under the Swiss NCCR-Climate program. Springer Science+Business Media, Inc., 2006 Endogenous technological learning nationallicence Strategic behavior nationallicence Climate policy nationallicence Emissions trading nationallicence Economic models nationallicence Dynamic games nationallicence Viguier Laurent Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland aut Barreto Leonardo Paul Scherrer Institute, Villigen, Switzerland aut Haurie Alain HEC-Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland aut Kypreos Socrates Paul Scherrer Institute, Villigen, Switzerland aut Rafaj Peter International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria aut Climatic Change Kluwer Academic Publishers 79/1-2(2006-11-01), 121-141 0165-0009 79:1-2<121 2006 79 10584 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9070-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-006-9070-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Viguier Laurent Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne, Switzerland aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Barreto Leonardo Paul Scherrer Institute, Villigen, Switzerland aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Haurie Alain HEC-Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kypreos Socrates Paul Scherrer Institute, Villigen, Switzerland aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Rafaj Peter International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Climatic Change Kluwer Academic Publishers 79/1-2(2006-11-01), 121-141 0165-0009 79:1-2<121 2006 79 10584 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer